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Abstract. Simulation models have been informing the COVID-19 policy-making process.  
These models, therefore, have significant influence on risk of societal harms. But how clearly 
are the underlying modelling assumptions and limitations communicated so that decision-
makers can readily understand them? When making claims about risk in safety-critical 
systems, it is common practice to produce an assurance case, which is a structured argument 
supported by evidence with the aim to assess how confident we should be in our risk-based 
decisions. We argue that any COVID-19 simulation model that is used to guide critical policy 
decisions would benefit from being supported with such a case to explain how, and to what 
extent, the evidence from the simulation can be relied on to substantiate policy conclusions. 
This would enable a critical review of the implicit assumptions and inherent uncertainty in 
modelling, and would give the overall decision-making process greater transparency and 
accountability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The epidemiological simulation models that have been informing the COVID-19 policy-
making process should be viewed as safety-critical systems. These models have direct and 
significant influence on the policies and decisions that aim to reduce the risk posed by the 
virus to public health [1]. However, a recent systematic review of 31 diagnostic and 
prediction models for COVID-19 concluded that, at present, none of these models could be 
recommended for practical use to inform critical policy decisions [2]. It is, therefore, vital 
that decision-makers are aware of the assumptions made in these models and that they can 
reflect on the limitations of the models in relation to practical decisions about the 
management of the pandemic.    
 
Similar to engineered safety-critical systems, e.g. flight control software or pacemakers, the 
rigour and transparency with which these simulation models are developed should be 
proportionate to their criticality to, and influence on, public health policy - this is true for  
COVID-19 but also holds for other models used to support such critical decision-making. In 
safety-critical systems engineering it is common practice to produce an assurance case — a 
structured, explicit argument supported by evidence [3]. Such cases are a primary means by 
which confidence in the safety of the system is communicated to, and scrutinised by, the 
diverse stakeholders, including regulators and policy makers. We believe it is important to 
support the COVID-19 simulation models with an assurance case that explains how, and the 
extent to which, the resulting evidence supports and substantiates the policy conclusions. We 
argue that such a case has the potential to enable a wider understanding, and a critical review, 
of the expected benefits, limitations and assumptions that underpin the development of the 
simulation models and the extent to which these issues, including the different sources of 
uncertainty, are considered in the policy decision-making process. 
ASSURANCE CASES IN SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
The use of assurance cases is a long-established practice in the safety-critical domain. 
Particularly in the UK, the development of an assurance case is a mandatory requirement in 
key sectors such as defence, nuclear and rail [4]. More pertinently, in the NHS, compliance 
with the clinical safety standards DCB0129 and DCB0160 requires an assurance case for 
Health IT systems [5]. An assurance case may consider different critical properties of a 
system. In this paper, we focus on safety. 
 
An assurance case is primarily used to communicate, support and critically evaluate a safety 
claim about risk-based decisions to commission a system or a service. Data from modelling, 
simulation, testing and in-service usage provides the evidence base for such a claim. 
However, this evidence is rarely conclusive. It entails different sources of uncertainty and 
hinges on technical, organisational and social assumptions. Further, in making risk-based 
decisions, tradeoffs are inevitable, e.g. between safety, privacy and costs. Justifications for 
these decisions have to be communicated to and accepted by the relevant stakeholders, e.g. 
by individuals or groups whose privacy might be reduced in return for an improvement in 
safety. To this end, a structured argument is used to explain the extent to which the evidence 
supports the safety claim, given the many sources of uncertainty, assumptions and tradeoffs. 
The argument is structured in the sense that it should make these issues and the way in which 
they relate to each other explicit for the different stakeholders to critically review, modify, 
accept or reject. The more complex and novel the system and its context are, the more 
significant the role of the assurance argument is in informing the risk-based decision-making 
process.  
 
Healthcare and public health interventions form a complex and adaptive set of interacting 
systems in which risk-based and evidence-based decisions would benefit from explicit and 
clear explanation by means of structured arguments. A study by the Health Foundation on the 
use of assurance cases in healthcare highlighted some potential benefits [6], primarily: 
1. promoting structured thinking about risk among clinicians and fostering 
multidisciplinary communication about safety; 
2. integrating evidence sources; 
3. aiding communication among stakeholders; and 
4. making the implicit explicit. 
ASSURANCE CASES FOR EVIDENCE-BASED COVID-19 POLICY As	a	highly	salient	example,	take	Report	9	by	the	Imperial	College	COVID-19	Response	Team	(“the	impact	of	Non-Pharmaceutical	Interventions	(NPIs)	on	the	reduction	of	COVID-19	mortality	and	healthcare	demand”)	[7].	This	is	an	example	of	microsimulation	providing	primary	evidence	which	has	significant	policy	implications.	We	can	view	a	policy	assurance	case	as	an	integration	of	the	following,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	1:		A. Data	from	microsimulation	providing	scientific	evidence;	B. Scientific	claims,	often	referred	to	as	“scientific	advice”,	concerning	the	effect	of	the	different	public	health	strategies	based	on	the	evidence;	and	C. Policy	claims	concerning	the	chosen	public	health	strategy	based	on	the	scientific	claims,	but	also	taking	into	account	national	values,	policy	goals,	etc.		The	relationships	between	the	above	can	be	established	through	the	following	arguments:	D. Scientific	argument	explaining	the	extent	to	which	the	microsimulation	evidence	(A)	supports	the	scientific	claims	(B);	E. Policy	argument	explaining	the	extent	to	which	the	scientific	claims	(B)	are	sufficient	to	support	the	policy	claims	(C);	and	F. Confidence	argument	in	the	trustworthiness	of	the	microsimulation	evidence	(A).		
	Figure	1:	Overall	Assurance	Case	Structure	for	a	COVID-19	Policy		
Scientific Evidence based on Microsimulation Simulation	models	are	engineering	artefacts.	As	such,	they	should	be	systematically	specified,	implemented	and	tested.	The	rigour	with	which	this	is	performed	should	be	proportionate	to	the	criticality	of	these	models	to	the	decision	making	process.	For	example,	the	COVID-19	model	used	by	the	Imperial	team	is	based	on	a	modified		individual-based		simulation	that	was	developed	to	support	pandemic	influenza	planning.	Models	can	be	for	a	specific	purpose	and	therefore	a	confidence	argument	would	need	to	justify	the	suitability	of	the	model	for	the	new	context,	including	the	continued	validity	of	the	original	parameters.	This	is	important	since	ad-hoc	reuse	and	modification	have	been	associated	with	catastrophic	accidents	in	other	safety-critical	domains	(e.g.	the	recent	Boeing	737	Max	accidents	[8]).	As	Thimbleby	recently	argued	[9],	the	quality	of	the	software	design	and	code	of	the	simulator	is	an	important	factor,	particularly	its	amenability	to	inspection	and	testing.	For	instance,	Neil	Ferguson,	the	lead	author	of	the	Imperial	report,	stated	the	following:	“For	me	the	code	is	not	a	mess,	but	it’s	all	in	
my	head,	completely	undocumented.	Nobody	would	be	able	to	use	it…	and	I	don’t	have	the	
bandwidth	to	support	individual	users''	[10].	In	a	safety-critical	context,	this	would	significantly	undermine	confidence	in	the	simulation	results.	We	can	note	that	this	is	defensible,	in	context	—	the	Imperial	team	was	working	under	tight	timescales	and	(longer-term)	it	does	plan	to	make	the	simulation	program	publicly	available.	We	hope	that	this	will	be	combined	with	the	actual	source	code	to	enable	wider	replication	and	evaluation	of	the	evidence.		The	validity	of	the	simulation	results	hinges	on	large	uncertainties	and	many	societal	assumptions,	e.g.	about	population	behavioural	changes.	In	large	part,	this	is	because	COVID-19	is	a	novel	virus,	with	relatively	little	reliable	data	on	transmission	rates.	The	developers	of	the	model	made	many	of	these	assumptions	explicit	through	listing	the	corresponding	parameters	and	where	data	exists	to	support	the	chosen	parameter	values.	This	should	enable	an	independent	assessment	and	evolution	of	the	model.	For	example,	the	report	states	an	assumption	that	30%	of	COVID-19	patients	who	are	hospitalised	will	require	critical	care	(invasive	mechanical	ventilation)	based	on	early	reports	from	cases	in	the	UK,	China	and	Italy.	We	now	know	that	this	was	a	significant	overestimate	due	to	a	combination	of	miscommunication	("critical	care"	in	many	other	countries	includes	non-invasive	measures	such	as	continuous	positive	airway	pressure	devices)	and	the	effects	of	the	initial	official	UK	advice	to	"intubate	early".	
Scientific Claim and Argument Given	the	novelty	of	the	virus	and	the	large	uncertainties	around	the	design	of	the	model	and	its	underpinning	data,	the	transition	from	the	simulation	results	to	the	overall	scientific	claim,	i.e.	scientific	advice	or	conclusions,	is	not	straightforward	[11].	We	recreated	the	scientific	argument	using	a	structured	argumentation	notation,	the	Goal	Structuring	Notation	(GSN)	[12].	GSN	is	widely	used	in	safety-critical	domains	for	creating	structured	assurance	arguments.	Figure	2	shows	a	simplified	example	of	how	a	structured	argument	can	be	used	to	capture	part	of	the	scientific	argument	through	identifying	the	claims	that	are	made,	the	evidence	that	supports	those	claims,	and	the	relationships	between	them.	Structured	arguments	also	help	to	ensure	that	the	key	assumptions	that	are	made	are	documented,	e.g.	exclusion	of	economic	and	non-COVID-19	health	implications.						
		 Figure	2:	An	example	of	part	of	a	structured	scientific	argument	for	COVID-19	Simulation	
	In	Figure	2,	the	results	of	modelling	for	different	NPIs	are	used	as	evidence	to	support	claims	about	the	positive	and	negative	effects	of	a	COVID-19	mitigation	strategy.	A	confidence	argument	in	the	trustworthiness	§of	the	microsimulation	evidence	is	developed	further,	referenced	but	not	shown	in	Figure	2,	and	considers	justification	of	the	way	in	which	the	model	was	adapted	and	tested,	including	the	choice	of	parameters.		
Policy Claim and Argument Moving	from	scientific	advice	and	evidence	to	a	policy	decision	requires	that	policy	makers	consider	assumptions,	risk	acceptance	beliefs	and	tradeoffs	(such	as	between	economic	and	medical	impact)	that	are	not	often	direct	and	amenable	to	rigorous	scientific	examination	[11].	The	transition	from	a	scientific	claim	to	a	policy	one	should	therefore	involve	a	complex	and	diverse	policy	argument	that	builds	on	the	scientific	claims,	but	also	brings	to	bear	these	additional	considerations	[13].	Imperial	College	Report	9	contains	some	explicit	policy	claims,	but	it	does	not	contain	a	policy	argument	[7].		A	good	policy	argument	should	justify	the	reliance	on	particular	sources	of	scientific	advice	and	models,	and	acknowledge	the	extent	to	which	the	underlying	sources	of	uncertainty	in	the	evidence	were	considered.	Alternative	scientific	claims	based	on	different	(potentially	conflicting)	models	should	also	be	considered	where	available.	The	policy	argument	should	make	clear	how	tradeoffs	were	made	and	how	evidence	concerning	the	economic,	legal	and	ethical	implications	of	the	chosen	policy	was	generated	and	appraised.	In	the	COVID-19	context,	such	evidence	should	also	incorporate	an	estimation	of	non-COVID-19	health	harms,	e.g.	potential	delays	in	cancer	diagnosis	and	treatment.			Highlighting	the	different	aspects	of	the	policy	argument	should	ensure	clarity	about	different	accountabilities:	(1)	the	accountability	of	the	scientists	to	base	their	scientific	advice	on	data	and	results	that	have	been	generated	in	a	trustworthy	manner;	and	(2)	the	accountability	of	the	policy	makers	to	appraise	the	different	items	of	evidence	and	clarify	the	basis	on	which	the	policy	was	established.	
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Our	society	is	currently	placing	great	weight	on	simulation	models	of	COVID-19	effects.	Although	such	models	are	essential	for	dealing	with	the	pandemic,	it	is	hard	to	know	which	we	should	trust,	to	what	extent,	under	what	conditions.	We	need,	therefore,	to	make	an	interdisciplinary	effort	to	understand	these	models,	and	to	support	that	effort	we	should	use	assurance	cases	to	capture	our	arguments	of	validity.		In	such	an	effort,	epidemiologists	and	health	data	scientists	will	have	a	central	role,	but	they	will	need	support	from	software	engineers,	including	those	with	safety-critical	software	experience.	Working	together,	such	collaborations	will	be	able	to	create	standards	for	the	developing,	testing	and	maintaining	these	models	in	a	consistent,	rigorous	and	auditable	manner.	They	will	be	able	to	build	assurance	cases	that	communicate	the	uncertainty,	assumptions	and	tradeoffs	to	a	wide	variety	of	stakeholders.	This	knowledge	will	then	aid	policymakers	in	using	pandemic	models	in	exactly	the	ways	that	they	are	useful,	and	not	in	the	ways	that	they	are	not.	
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